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In Part I of this Article,1 I described and set about to criticize a
rule regarding claims by indigent persons to be relieved of court access
fees, a rule which seems to be emerging from recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.' The emergent rule, as I described it,
"defines -asubgroup (call it X) of all persons, such that whenever a person is within X, that person is denied due process if he is refused access to
* This is Part II of a two-part essay. Part I appeared in issue No. 6 of the
1973 Duke Law Journal.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1957, Yale University; LL.B.
1960, Harvard University.
1. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights-Part1, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153 [hereinafter cited as Part 1].
2. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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court because of inability to pay a state-imposed fee"; and X, under the
emergent rule, "means any of the following: a defendant in criminal proceedings, a defendant in civil proceedings, or a plaintiff in civil proceedings seeking vindication of a constitutionally favored or 'fundamental'
interest where relief is unobtainable extrajudicially." My aim in Part I
was not to appraise the emergent rule's soundness or necessity as an
elaboration of prior legal doctrine and precedent, but rather was to
show that there is "no combination of plausible moral principles" which
can explain or justify a rule that accords protection to members of X
but withholds protection from certain other civil plaintiffs-a group
of others which turns out to be "so broad and inclusive that one might
as well refer to civil plaintiffs generally." Such a showing, I said,
"will not itself establish that indigent civil plaintiffs generally are constitutionally entitled to access-fee relief, but it will be an important
step along the way."'
The discussion now shifts its focus from the realm of moral principle to that of legal doctrine, including constitutional texts and related
judicial holdings. I do not wish to suggest that the two realms can
ultimately be held apart. To the contrary, I would affirm that judges
elaborating doctrine, and critics of the judicial product, must strive to
produce a collection of holdings or equivalent statements which are
appreciably coherent; and I do not know what could impart coherence to a body of doctrinal statements save their joint consistency with
some body of principle not wholly accessible through the statements
alone, and in that sense external to the statements. I accept that the
principles which can impart needed coherence to judicial holdings and
dicta need not be static ones, but may be always evolving and not fully
discoverable or determinable at any given moment.4 From this it
seems to follow that criticism appealing to principles must often be inconclusive. Decisions which appear inexplicable in terms of currently
understood principle may be signs that the evolution of principles
continues and a new synthesis impends.
But not every judicial decision which seems discordant within an
extant ,theoretical environment must be received as a harbinger of some
brave new reconceptualization. To be sure, one might boldly imagine
that the Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein decisions, with their emphasis on
the possibility of out-of-court interchange between the disputants as a
way of resolving claims of right, foreshadow a new, reigning conception of legal rights as expressions of publicly shared values to which
3. PartI at 1169-70.
4. See Dworkin, The Original Position, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 500, 509-14 (1973).
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voluntary acquiescence can normally be expected and which, indeed,

can be fully realized only through voluntary acquiescence. Such an interpretation could not be refuted merely by showing that other, roughly
contemporaneous decisions seem to point in -a different direction.5

A

more fundamental hindrance to seeing -the notion of rights-as-sharedvalues as an inspiration for the access-fee decisions, might be that the

notion clashes with a vision of human nature and associated concepts
of law, rights, and the judicial role, which seem implicit in the Court's
assumption of the very powers of constitutional review it has been exercising in these cases." The Constitution calls itself supreme "law,"
and it purports to establish "rights" (and such cognate or subsidiary
entities as "liberty," "property," and certain "freedoms"). Judicial review of executive and legislative action evidently proceeds upon the
belief that "law" and "rights" necessarily entail authoritative interpre-

tation and enforcement by an entity standing dispassionately outside
the context of interaction which has brought the claimed law or

right into question; and it thus harmonizes with a vision of human nature, well established in the liberal tradition, which inclines us to a

workaday understanding of law and rights not as the product of
shared values but as limited, tactical sacrifices of freedom, made for

the sake of maximizing freedom generally by forcibly protecting it
against the worse incursions of unruly humanity.'
Aside from the dim possibility that they betoken some profound

alteration of theoretical perspective, the access-fee decisions can be
counted wrong if they are inexplicable in terms of currently available

principle, as that is reflected in contemporaneous doctrine.

Having

focused in Part I on issues of principle considered without regard to
5. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
where the Court can be understood as saying that legally compelled disclosure and explanation by officials of their reasons for treating a citizen adversely, accompanied by
opportunity for the citizen to participate in examining those reasons, serves a useful
purpose and therefore is required by the due process guaranty only where the citizen
has some judicially enforceable right at stake. This view of the Roth case is developed
and explored in an essay I am preparing for NoMos (to be published by Atherton
Press, New York, late 1974).
6. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1958) (opinion of the Court); id.
at 21-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DuKE L.L 1, 21-29.
7. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STumns 351 (1973). Compare Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of
Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962, 993-98 (1973). That there may be certain cases in
which legal rights are conceived to exist naked of judicial remedies-for example, cases
involving sovereign immunity or "political questions"--does not contradict my general
statement. Indeed, the fact that these cases are so terribly vexing and problematic
tends to confirm that statement.
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contemporary constitutional-law doctrine, I want in the remainder of
this article to examine whether that doctrine will support the conclusion towards which the prior discussion plainly gravitates.
One might as well begin with the question of what the constitutional texts will bear. My chief texts will be the due process clauses.
It seems evident that the language of these clauses will easily accommodate a decision invalidating court access fees as applied to indigent,
would-be civil plaintiffs. One might want to say that the word "property" encompasses legally established expectations of relief in the form
of a judicial judgment or decree whenever certain conditions prevail
or certain events have occurred, and that the state commits a "deprivation without due process of law" when it prevents fulfillment of such
expectations by charging an access fee. Alternatively, we can (as a
tentative formulation) say that "liberty" encompasses the interest in
pressing litigation as far as the provable facts and prevailing law will
carry you, and that the state deprives you of that part of liberty without due process when it exacts a price for enjoyment which you are
unable to pay. I shall rely on the second sort of formulation. Its main
advantage is that it avoids the circularity so often encountered when a
legal claim depends on a debatable assertion that something is "property." If "property" is to be defined in terms of legally justified expectations, then, since the access fees are a long-standing element in
the legal backdrop, one's property might not include the right to litigate
There, then, is my doctrinal proposition: opportunity to litigate,
whenever such opportunities are normally available to the citizenry at
large, is one of those special components of due process liberty variously called a "basic liberty," a "preferred freedom," or a "fundamental interest."9 My arguments in support of this proposition are advanced within a certain methodology which the Supreme Court has
been evolving for dealing with claims, founded on the due process and
8. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 463 n.6 (1973) (Marshall, I., dissenting).
Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist,
J.).
Comment,
Boddie:
Kras
Ortwein, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. Lia. L. Rnv. 570, 586-87 (1973).
9. Other articles and notes cited herein-perhaps especially that of Professor
Goodpaster, note 23
developed arguments for treating litigation access as
a "substantive" right enjoying a protected status under the due process clauses. I have
also had access to an unpublished effort, Wille,
(1973), a paper submitted by one of my seminar students at
about the time my first draft had been completed. A few of the more obvious points
of contact between our efforts are noted below. My indebtedness to Mr. Wille may
well be broader, by reason either of my reading of his paper or of oral exchanges between us.
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equal protection clauses, for judicial protection of personal interests or
rights. The methodology is distinguished by two characteristics: (i)
it allows for varying degrees of judicial protection-varying levels of
"strictness" of review--depending on what right or interest it is for
which protection is claimed; and (ii) it -ranks or classifies rights and
interests, for this purpose, according to the clarity and force with which
-the Constitution-either specific texts or the whole constitutional plan
-seems to single out various rights and interests as needing or deserving special protection. The notion of strictness of review itself is
treated as containing two subquestions: (a) What governmental objectives, or what sorts of objectives, will be allowed to count as reasons
for encroaching on the protected interest or right, and (b) how
"tight a fit will be required between the government's justifying objective and its questioned practice? (How insistent will the Court be
on resort to "the least restrictive alternative"?)
Much recent discussion about this methodology has considered
whether the two major dimensions-nature of the interest, strictness
of review-are or ought to be treated as calling for relativistic evaluation along continuous, bi-polar scales, or rather as posing "either-or"
questions of assignment to dichotomous categories. 10 In the "twotiered" or "either-or" version, an interest either is or isn't classed as
"fundamental," while review is either "strict" or "loose." A fundamental interest begets strict review; other interests occasion only loose review. In the "continuous" version, the closer an interest lies to the
"fundamental" pole, the stricter the review it evokes. Also possible
are hybrid versions, as well as conceptions of altogether greater sophistication and complexity. 1 For example, one significant variant
seems to be that in which (i) an either-or question is asked about
whether an interest has received any special recognition in the Constitution; (ii) if the answer is no, review is denied entirely; and (iii) if
the answer is yes, review is to be substantial, with its specific content
and strategy shaped by the nature and importance of the interest.' "
A minimally activist, maximally modest formulation of a general
rule issuing from the evolving methodology in any of its versions
10. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
11. See Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process 'of Life

and Law, 87 HAuv. L. Rv. 1 (1973).
12. A very recent decision which suggests this hybrid is Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974). See also Nowack, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classification, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974).
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might be: governmental practices which hamper enjoyment of constitutionally recognized ("protected") rights and interests are unsupportable if the practices could be altered so as to reduce significantly their
hampering effects, without jeopardizing any substantial governmental
interest over and above the interest in convenience and efficiency of
internal administration.1" An ostensible corollary of this rule, one
which received special attention and explicit restatement in the Rodriguez opinion, is that the charging of fees by the government for the
exercise of protected rights or enjoyment of protected interests is a
highly suspect practice insofar as the fees are imposed with exclusion14
ary effect.
I shall be trying to show that a person's interest in obtaining a
fair hearing, when he claims that a legal entitlement of his has been
violated, is one of those constitutionally recognized and protected interests to which the foregoing formulations apply, irrespective of
whether the alleged violator is a public official or a private agent. According to Rodriguez, -the "importance of a service . . .does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental" and "social importance
is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny." Rather, "the answer lies in assessing whether [the claimed right is]
. ..expressly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."' 5 Yet express mention of the interest or right is not required. "The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting
process can no longer be doubted even though. . . 'the right to vote
in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.' "16 Nor, as has
often been noted, is "privacy" or "association" expressly mentioned;
yet it has evidently been the special values that these two words evoke
for the Court which have prompted holdings that private choice about
certain matters is constitutionally protected against governmental usur7
pation.1
13. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. CL 791 (1974).
14. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973)
(dictum). As to whether the exclusionary-fee rule truly is a corollary of the convenience-and-efficiency rule, see text accompanying notes 107-12, infra.
15. Id. at 30, 32, 33-34. In the context of the Rodriguez discussion, the word
"service" can fairly be taken as including such varied benefits as legal representation,
education, access to the vote, freedom to marry, procreate, or travel.
16. Id. at 34 n.74, quoting Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
665 (1966).
17. The matters include procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
as interpreted in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973), and in San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 n.76 (1973); abortion, Roe v,
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); marriage,Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), as interpreted in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971), and in United States v,
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It will be a part of my task to show that due process, in its nar-

rowest, most distinctive, and most conventional ("procedural") sense
of a defensive right to be heard, is no less expressive of or instinct
with an unmentioned plaintiff's right to a fair hearing than is the equal
protection clause with its unmentioned right "to participate in elections
[or in the voting process] on. an equal basis with other citizens in the

jurisdiction,"' 18 or are the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments
with their unmentioned right of family privacy.' 9
There may be another possiblity. Some fundamental rights may
be inferred not from the text of the Constitution but from its metatext-from the complex of understandings which seemingly must underlie the whole governmental system therein established.20 Most noKras, 409 U.S. at 444; divorce, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), as interpreted in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. at 440-46, 449-50; receipt and possession of
information, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and child rearing, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), as interpreted in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 376,
and in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. at 444.
18. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74
(1973), citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
19. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 nn.73,
76 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. Cf. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 17-19 (1971); Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1972 Sup. Cr. R V. 41, 60.
Mr. Bork (whom Professor Winter follows) speaks of "deriv[ing] rights from governmental processes established by the Constitution," a course of reasoning which he
distinguishes from that of "tak[ing] from the document rather specific values that text
or history show the framers actually to have intended ... ." Bork, supra at 17. Another distinction apparently embraced by Mr. Bork is that between rights which are
"possessed by the individual because the Constitution has made a value choice about
individuals" (call these "intrinsic" rights) and rights which are "located in the individual for the sake of a governmental process that the Constitution outlines . . . because
his enjoyment of them will lead him to defend them in court and thereby preserve the
governmental process from legislative or executive deformation" (call these "instrumental" rights). Id. Mr. Bork seems to say (but without offering any explanation
for this view) that all the "derived" (what I have called "metatextual") rights are of
the instrumental sort. Adopting the Bork categories, one might be attracted by the
thought that there is an instrumental ground for "deriving!' constitutional protection of
the litigation rights of those who contend against the government (and especially criminal defendants?), since the exercise of such rights seems calculated to "preserve the
governmental process from . . . deformation;" and through such thinking one could
perhaps avoid a parallel inference of constitutional protection for civil litigation rights.
But why must or should the inference of rights from the whole constitutional plan be
limited to those which fit the instrumentalist, countervailing-power perspective? Why
may not the whole constitutional plan with equal force imply a recognition of intrinsic
rights? Why may it not project an ideal conception of human good or need--or of
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tably, the right "to participate in elections [or in the voting process]
on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction," though the
Court has ascribed it to the equal protection clause, may also spring
from metatextual sources; and I shall argue in the next section that,
insofar as it does, so does a right of equal juridical participation.

A.

ESTABLISHING "PROTECTED" STATUS FOR THE

COURT-ACCESS RIGHT

1.

The MetatextualArgument: Voting and LitigatingCompared

There are a number of striking resemblances between the interests in voting and in litigating. 21 Some of these resemblances could be
called rhetorical, consisting as they do of statements loosely descriptive of both voting and litigating, which are not susceptible of anything approaching rigorous demonstration. Both the voting and
litigating interests base a claim to "fundamentality" on the idea
that they are "preservative of all rights";2 2 of both it can be said that
"in social compact terms, in exchange for this legal and orderly method
of resolving disputes, one restricts his power to satisfy his claims by
force. '2 3 It is said that "ability to litigate just claims, like availability
of the franchise, gives legitimacy to the state's coercive power." 24 The
second Justice Harlan shared these perceptions:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental -than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling
them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in
an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social
organization and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to
seek regularized resolution of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables them to strive for achievements without
the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized society. Put more
succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that allows society to
reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call "the state of
nature."
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of
individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlerole, or citizenship, or social relations-which compels the recognition of some right,
say a right of civil litigation, for noninstrumentalist, nonutilitarian reasons?
21. See Wille, supra note 9, at 19.
22. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966), quoting
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
23. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and
the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. Rnv. 223, 251 (1970).
24. The Supreme Court,1970 Term, 85 HAXv. L. R v. 104, 109-10 (1971).
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ment, not on custom or the will of strategically placed individuals, but
on the common-law model. It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this framework
those who wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and
later those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the centrality of the concept of due process in the operation of this system.
Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights, neither
liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's monopoly
over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to
be acceptable under our scheme of things. Only by providing that the
social enforcement mechanism must function strictly within these
bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is also just.25
Justice Harlan's eloquence may help put us in a frame of mind
receptive to the analytical resemblances between the voting and litigating interests.

One has to begin by frankly recognizing that on any particular
occasion, perhaps on most occasions on which one is entitled to vote
or litigate if one so chooses, the one so entitled may have little or
nothing of importance immediately at stake. He may not much care,
or have any great reason for caring, who wins the election or whether
the referendum question is voted up or down. Similarly, though he
may have a winning cause of action, he may not be greatly concerned,
or have any reason for being greatly concerned, about receiving the
remedy to which he is entitled. In either case, if forced to pay the
full marginal cost of exercising the participatory right, a person might
well choose to forego it. In fact, this often happens in both modes of
participation. People stay away from the polls in droves, especially in
bad weather, evidently because they have too little immediately at
stake to warrant the inconvenience of going out to vote. People likewise often forbear to sue even when their probabilities of winning are
near unity, because victory is not worth the expense (including personal inconvenience). Both as to voting and as to litigating, there are
respectable reasons for believing that these economic-deterrence effects
28
are often salutary.
25. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971).
26. As for litigating, see note 85 infra and accompanying text. As for voting,
there is an argument that any device which causes the probability of one's casting a
vote to vary with the intensity of one's concern about the issues or candidates, tends
to increase the election's net output of aggregate voter satisfaction. Cf. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684-85 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
This argument may be vulnerable to the charge of overlooking the noninstrumental significance of voting-as, for example, a symbolic reaffirmation of membership in the
community-but it is, even so, both a plausible and respectable view.
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Yet the general anticipation of one's being free to participate (vote
or litigate) when one wants or needs to do so seems tremendously significant, wholly apart from whether such a want or need ever actually
materializes and motivates a person to vote or sue. This anticipation
matters both on account of its deterrent effects on the behavior of
those who must contemplate being voted on or sued, and on account
of its effects on the potential participant's own understanding of society and of his or her place in it. As to voting, the point hardly requires elaboration. The low voter turnouts which regularly bring cries
of consternation and exclamations of fear for the health of "our democratic system" plainly must reflect (at least in part) the effectiveness
of people's potential vote. If politicians' anticipation that people will
vote when they feel the need causes the politicians to act in such a way
as to minimize people's feelings of needing to vote, then in many instances people will not vote because, as it turns out, they don't need to.
In this light, a person's failure to vote, or his readiness to admit on
the occasion of any particular election that he doesn't much care if he
votes today or not, is no evidence at all that his right to vote in general is not important to him. Quite possibly he has been participatingmaking his will count-all along by letting it be supposed that he will
vote if pushed to it.
Cannot much the same thing be said of one's right to litigate
in general? We are, it may be said, a juridical society. I say a juridical
society, not a fractious or litigious one (though by some lights the latter adjectives, too, may be thought applicable). To a notable degree
the panorama of our public life and human interaction occurs against
a backdrop of supposed, even if vaguely comprehended, legal rights,
entitlements, and protections-all potentially realizable through litigation, but all meaningful also simply by virtue of their inchoate public
recognition, quite apart from whatever explicit litigation threat may
develop. This jural backdrop must surely exert a deep and pervasive
influence not only on our dealings with one another but on our very
attitudes towards one another. 7 Some dim awareness that courts are
available as a last resort to protect one's entitlements, including, to
some extent, one's claims to fair and just treatment, must certainly, in
our society in its present stage of evolution, make a significant contribution to whatever sense of security people feel in entering into relationships with others-relationships often involving personal exposure
or dependency of one sort or another. This means that for the exceptional person for whom the courts promise or turn out to be effectively
27. See Abram, Access to the JudicialProcess, 6 GA. L. Rnv. 247 (1972).
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inaccessible, the sense of security-and with it self-respect-may be
significantly undetermined. On the other hand, suspicion that certain
others cannot count upon effective juridical access can hardly help
biasing the shape of transactions, relationships, and attitudes that arise
between oneself and those others. And what of the influence of the
jural backdrop on legislative activity? Who doubts that the legislature,
when it considers what general rules or entitlements should prevail in
some sector of human affairs, -tends to proceed on the comforting assumption that the courts, fully armed not only with whatever rule or
entitlement the legislature may promulgate but also with the traditions
and principles of common law and equity, are there if needed to prevent
unanticipated injustice? Insofar as that assumption is untrue for any
person, is that person not being exploited -bythe legislative process? Indeed, do not all these considerations fairly add up to a conclusion that
any person who cannot rest assured that in situations of legal stress
he or she will have effective access to the juridical system is to that extent excluded from the circle of citizens, much as a person would be
excluded by denial of the franchise?28
To be effective, anticipation must be credible. If a right to participate in general is vitally important because of what results from the
general anticipation of it, then there is need for caution about refusing to honor the right on particular occasions of its attempted exercise
because the costs of that particular exercise don't seem to be worth the
immediate stakes. This is obvious to all in the case of voting, and it
seems no less true in the case of litigating. Moreover, as to both
voting and litigating it can be argued that the risk of being excluded
on a particular occasion by functional indigency-inability to pay even
a scaled-down fee in a partially subsidized system-is a risk that may
not fairly be imposed. Insofar as the anticipatory importance of participation pertains to deterrence, the argument would have to be that
an entire, distinguishable interest group (people with little wealth and
low incomes) will thus be excluded with resulting skewing of the incentive system away from the degree of concern for their interests that
is due them. And insofar as the anticipatory importance of participation lies in its meaning for the self-image of the potential participant, the argument is that the impecunious person, having to contem28. See Abram, supra note 27, at 251: "[T]he question whether access to
the courts will be facilitated by removal of financial barriers . . . is important to potential litigants because it tells them whether they will have equal access to this 'more
rational' source of power. It tells them, in short, whether the society in which they
live will allow them to enjoy this fundamental component of civilization. It tells them
whether they will be fully enfranchised citizens."
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plate not just one but an indefinite series of exclusions, would suffer
just the injuries which his participatory right is supposed to avoid.
However persuasive one may find these arguments, they seem
about as persuasive when applied to litigation as when applied to voting. And that is enough to establish the analogy between voting and
litigating required for the constitutional-law argument I am trying to
build-that insofar as metatextual considerations argue for consecration of general voting rights in a special status of constitutional protection against frustration by access fees, 29 such considerations argue as
strongly for a like conclusion :about general litigation rights. For this
purpose, it matters not whether the special constitutional status is
called a part of "due process liberty" or of the "substantive" aspect
of equal protection of the laws.
It should be clear that my argument comparing access to the
courts through litigation with access to the legislatures through voting
does not rest on the theory that judicial decisions are "really" just
legislation from another source; nor is the argument's reach limited
to "law reform" cases in which the differences between adjudication and legislation are least distinct. The argument treats litigation and legislation as distinct processes, but as bound up with one
another in an entire, political-legal order in which the court's part
is no less critical than the legislature's-and no less critical where the
rights for which vindication is sought are of the plainest, best-established sort than where they arexof phenomenal social significance or
are still straining for judicial recognition. The Supreme Court has signified its agreement through its decisions treating voluntary association for litigation purposes as an exercise of first amendment rights:
That view holds whether the aim of the litigation be the overthrow of
Jim Crow3" or the recovery of damages for personal injury.3 1

It would, conversely, be a mistake to think that constitutional
protection for court access is limited to cases in which persons seek judicial effectuation of established or conceded rights under existing le32
gal interpretations, and does not extend to quests for "law reform."
29. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966);
cf. Lubin v. Panish, 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
30. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
31. See UMW, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964);
Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 595 (1973); cf.
Willging, FinancialBarriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 Guo. L.J.
253, 282-83 (1968).
32. See generally Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
699 (1969).
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Judicial decisions that might loosely be classed as "law reform" are of
course not that in strict formalistic theory,8 3 but rather are the vindication of positively established rights. If, for example, a suit is successfully brought to correct the diversion of certain grant-in-aid funds from
congressionally specified beneficiary groups, 3 4 the effect on administrative practice may resemble that of a change in law; administrators, required for the first time to obey the law, and to conform their own
regulations to it, may feel as though the law has been "changed"; but
they are simply mistaken in that feeling.
Obviously this point can be escalated one step, to the level where
statutory law is tested against the Constitution. In what sense is it
correct to say, for example, that the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut3" is "law reform" rather than simply the securing to Mrs. Boddie and
her "classmates" of their established rights under the existing Supreme
Law of the land? Some would answer that, in applying the broad mandates of the fourteenth amendment and other constitutional abstractions, the Supreme Court and other courts are in reality making and
changing-not simply applying-the law. The metatextual argument,
if accepted, excuses us from resolving the theoretical controversy to
which that answer leads. For however we wish to characterize the way
our courts behave in constitutional cases, that is how they do behave.
That judicial behavior, whatever it is and whatever we call it, is accessible to a substantial portion of the citizenry-those able to afford
the costs. That judicial behavior is part and parcel of our political system as it is found from time to time. Whether that behavior is contained wholly within the juridical sector or spills over into the legislative sector matters not for the force of the proposition that, whatever
the political system-the governmental system-is at a given moment, all citizens by virtue of their citizenship have a "fundamental interest" in access to it.
We are a juridical society. We are also, to some unutterable extent, a judge-governed society. Access to courts and access to legislatures are claims that merge into one another, to just that same unutterable extent. Law reform and law application are, to that same extent,
but different perspectives on one governmental process. You cannot,
without confusion, call a person a citizen and at the same time sanc33. Le., the theory according to which courts, as such, have no proper function
save to apply the established, general rules of positive law to the specific fact situations
before them. See Kennedy, supranote 7, at 358-59.
34. E.g., Natonabah v. Gallup-McKinely County Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716
(D.N.M. 1973).
35. 401U.S. 371 (1971).
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tion the exclusion of that person from that process.m
2.

ProtectionForCourt Access Inferred
From ProceduralDue Process

In this section I shall not argue that litigation access for civil
plaintiffs is directly encompassed within the established strict right of
defensive procedural due process which furnished the Court's basic
premise in Boddie and countless other cases . 7 It is tempting to see in
every violation of a legal right, whether by private agents or public
officials, a "deprivation" of property or liberty which becomes a violation of the constitutional due process guaranty when the state fails to
provide a genuine opportunity to seek requital in the courts; 8 however, this approach is not wholly satisfactory. It undeniably lays some
strain on the constitutional text: To say "[n]o state shall deprive any person of liberty or property" is not quite to say "[e]ach state shall effectively vindicate all claims arising out of deprivations by anyone of liberty or property." If, as has been suggested, the requisite "state action" - the state's authorship of a deprivation-is to be located in the
legal rules forbidding self-help, 9 the resulting protection against exclusion from court by access fees will not apply in any case where we
can conjure up some lawful self-help method that might have worked,
be it ever so imprudent or impractical.4 0 If, as has also been suggested,
36. "Both voting and access to the courts are forms of enfranchisement, of participation in the political process." Abram, supra note 27, at 259. A like point is made
in Wille, supranote 9, at 5.
37. Many are cited in Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377-78 n.3. A notable post-Boddie decision is Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
38. See Willging, supra note 31, at 287-88.
39. See Goodpaster,supra note 23, at 251-52.
40. See Part I at 1195-96 & n.146. Of course, as the Kras opinion reminds us,
see id. at 1159-60, there is available in virtually every case (divorce is the chief exception) at least one lawful, practicable, and prudent (if erratically effective) method of
self-help, namely, appeal to the conscience and good will of your adversary. Professor
Goodpaster, supra note 23, foreseeing this rejoinder, stipulates that due process rights
are violated by legal rules "which require an individual to resort to a court for the
protection of an interest or claim or to go begging." Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
But the question remains: Since the state did not itself commit the injurious act, and
since it doesn't prevent the victim from presenting his claim of right to the injurer,
how can it be said that the state has committed a deprivation? And what if the state
hasn't forbidden all other imaginable forms of self-help? What if the victim was legally privileged but physically unable to withstand the finance company man's repossession of his car? Or could have avoided repossession by keeping the car holed up in
a garage? At bottom, the trouble with locating the requisite state action in rules forbidding self-help is that only sometimes-perhaps rarely-are those rules really relevant
to the victim's predicament. Often or usually the reason he needs access to the courts
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the state action is to be located in the private injurer's having committed the injury while acting in a statelike role or performing a "state
function," 41 the resulting protection against exclusion from court by
access fees will apparently apply only to cases in which the injurer was
bent upon some remedial self-help project of his own."2
But the act of barring access to the courts, by demanding fees
from persons unable to pay them, unquestionably belongs to the
state; 43 and it is that sort of state action which, I argue, unconstitutionally restricts enjoyment of a constitutionally recognized liberty of litigation access. There is no need to look any further for state action
(although, as will be seen, the "state action" qualification on fourteenth amendment guaranties remains a problem for the argument).
Nor is there any need to insist that the protected liberty, of which the
state deprives a functionally indigent person by demanding the fee, is
the same thing as-or is quite contained within-the established, defensive procedural due process right of notice and opportunity to be
heard. It will be enough to show that the substantive right of access
is so closely related to the strict right of defense, is so clearly suggested
by the evident purpose of the strict defensive right, as to partake of
constitutional protection through the "fundamental interest" conception given its most recent formulation in Rodriguez.4
a.

The Currently EstablishedBroad Meaning of
Defensive ProceduralDue Process

We can divide the disputable elements in a civil action into the
three categories of injury, justification, and cause. Let us define "jusis not that the state is forbidding him to use some alternative, self-help recourse which
would serve him just as well; but rather that there is not and never has been any alternative recourse, which as a matter of fact would have been effective, practicable, 'prudent, and reasonable to expect him to take. (Insofar as that is not true, there may
well be a substantive defense to his claim, on the order of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, "coming to the nuisance," failure to mitigate damages, or some
other manifestation of the "rule of avoidable consequences.")
41. See Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 355, 377-79 (1973).
42. The statement in the text is amplified in the Appendix, see text accompanying
notes 118-19 infra. Various other theories of "state action" in the context of self-help
repossession by secured creditors are advanced by Clark & Landers, supra note 41. See
also McDonnell, Sniadach, The Replevin Cases, and Self-Help Repossession-Due
Process Tokenism?, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv. 437 (1973). Opposing arguments
are marshalled in Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors'
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (Parts I
&l1); 47 S. CAL. L. RPv. 1 (1973) (Part II).
43. See Goodpaster, supra note 23, at 251; cf. Comment, supra note 8, at 588.
44. See notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text.
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tification" to mean an objectively verifiable explanation or account
of a person's conduct or the circumstances attending it, where under
an applicable rule of law some explanation of that sort would absolve
that conduct of legally wrongful quality despite its having caused harm
to another. Examples of justifications are: "My conduct was consistent with my promises"; "my conduct was consistent with all pertinent regulatory laws"; "my conduct was reasonable under the circumstances."
Now let us say that a person, P, sustains a "legally cognizable injury" whenever the conduct of another person, D, causes an unwelcome impact upon P, and under the applicable legal rules D who
causes such an impact by such conduct becomes subject to a demand
by P for justification; which is to say that D is not legally free, at
least without compensating P for his losses, to cause such an impact
by such conduct at his completely unrestricted discretion. 45 A term
closely related to legally cognizable injury is "entitlement," where entitlement refers to any treatment which the applicable law says P is
(or is not) to receive from D unless a justification exists. An entitlement is treatment which D may not lawfully withhold from (or impose upon) P at D's completely unrestricted discretion. Legally cognizable injury, then, is the exact equivalent of denial or violation of an
46
entitlement.
Finally, let us use the phrase "cause' or "legal cause" to signify
that sort of factual, causal connection between P's harm and D's conduct which will render D legally liable for the harm if it is a legally
cognizable injury and D's conduct is not justified.
To illustrate: A
45. I intend no implication that D will always, or usually, be assigned burdens of
proof on justification issues.
It should be noted that my definitions confine the justification category to questions about whether D's conduct violated a legal norm-leaving to the legal injury category questions about whether P's injury was "within the risk" contemplated by any
norm which D's conduct did violate or whether the violated norm defined a "duty"
which D owed to P. This sort of question is not easily assigned to one or the other
category. It might well be thought a part of justification for D to contend that the
legal order does not mean to include liability for a given sort of injury to a given sort
of P (or liability to injunctions at the behest of such P's sustaining such injuries)
among the sanctions faced by agents who must shape their conduct in contemplation
of legal norms. My reason for assigning the "risk" or "duty" question to the category
of injury rather than justification is a rhetorical one explained in note 52 infra.
46. Entitlements thus are not "absolute" claims which override all possible justifications, but rather claims triggering demands for some sort of justification. This usage,
which may strike some readers as artificial, is adopted because it corresponds with the
Supreme Court's usage in conceptualizing procedural due process rights. See note 52
infra and accompanying text.
47. These are all, to be sure, question-begging definitions. But the questions they
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person suffering bodily harm from the conduct of another has undoubtedly sustained a legally cognizable injury, although on many occasions justification will be rather easy (e.g., the harm was unintended
and the conduct prudent). A person gazed at on the street, or refused
private charity, has certainly not sustained a legally cognizable injury.
A person denied public employment has sustained no such injury by
virtue of the refusal simpliciter.48 Yet one may have a legally protected claim not to be denied public employment in violation of a
special contract, express or implied, 40 or in violation of legally established procedures; 50 one may also have legally protected claims not
to be denied employment for certain illicit reasons-for example, that
one is of Ukrainian extraction or is a subscriber to American Opinion."
In these latter cases, it seems less apt to describe the legal injury as
denial of employment than as discrinination, punishment of speech

and association, or violation of reliance upon, and expectations regarding, promises and procedural regularity.

Our definitions can now be used to state what seems to be the
currently accepted meaning of defensive procedural due process:

whenever state officials by their conduct cause a legally cognizable injury
to any person--or, in other words, violate any of that person's entitlements-that person may demand that the officials submit the question of

justification to binding appraisal by an impartial officer in a proceeding
in which the injured person has had a fair opportunity to participate. 52
beg-those regarding the actual or ideal content of the legal rules-do not immediately
concern us.
Again, I can see no clear reason of principle why "risk"/"duty" questions might
not be assigned to the legal cause category just as well as to the injury category. See
generally R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963). The choice is
strictly a matter of expository convenience. It has no critical bearing on the argument
I am making.
48. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
49. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
50. Cf. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 463 (1974).
51. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 92 S. Ct. 1633 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597-98 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
52. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (dictum); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). The theory underlying these three decisions seems to be: Any officially authored deprivation of liberty or property triggers the defensive rights of procedural due
process. "Liberty" encompasses a number of interests which, by virtue of legal protection accorded by the Constitution itself, officials may not violate at their unfettered
discretion--or, in other words, without justification. "Property" encompasses any other
interests ("entitlements") which, by virtue of legal protection accorded by statute, common law, or special contract sanctioned by statute or common law, officials may not
violate at discretion and without justification. A majority of the Supreme Court has
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That statement, which may seem innocent enough at first acquaintance,
has a number of important and perhaps surprising implications which can
be brought out by considering a series of possible cases.
Case A: A state official inflicts legally cognizable injury at the
behest of a private person, and cites as justification a remedial claim
pertaining to that private person.53 Under Fuentes v. Shevin," this
triggers defensive procedural due process (DPDP) rights.
recently confirmed this reading of the decisions. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 92 S. Ct.
1633, 1670 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ.); id.
at 1650 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J.) ("While the legislature may
elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without [providing
a constitutionally required minimum of] appropriate procedural safeguards."); id. at
1660 (White, J., dissenting) ("While the State may define what is and what is not
property, once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due process, and as
I understand it six members of the Court are in agreement on this fundamental proposition.").
It can now be seen why I have chosen to assign "risk" or "duty" questions to the
injury rather than the justification category. Injury-denial of "entitlement"-is a
threshold issue in the procedural due process model. Only upon its appearing that officials have acted so as to subject themselves to a demand for justification can there arise
a question of due process obligations. Assigning the "risk" or "duty" question to justification would have lowered the due process threshold and made my restatement of the
current doctrine less modest and more controversial than it now is. But the choice
is merely rhetorical. In the final analysis, it makes no difference. See text accompanying notes 64-65 infra.
One might wonder whether "standing" doctrine requires qualification of the proposition that due process entails a right on the part of one who has sustained a legally
cognizable injury to demand justification from an official who has legally caused that
injury. But it is strongly arguable that pre-trial dismissals explained on "standing"
grounds must always rest either on a judicial determination that the plaintiff has sustained no legally cognizable injury, or else on judicial acceptance of some substantive
justification advanced by the official. See Albert, supra note 50, at 425, 427-42, 46468, 493-97.
Standing doctrine may, however, have a quite different effect which should be
noted: It may allow some lawsuits to be maintained by persons who have sustained
no relevant legally cognizable injury. See id. at 468-76. It seems that insofar as the
argument against exclusionary access fees rests on analogy between the proposed right
of litigation access and the established defensive right of procedural due process, it
would not apply to litigation asserting only the rights of others or of the public. But
drawing such a line may be exceedingly impractical. Compare Part I at 1211-15.
Moreover, the argument based on analogy between litigation and voting, see notes 2136 supra and accompanying text, seems to apply with full force to "third-party" and
"public interest" claims.
53. By a "remedial" claim or action I mean one designed to correct or resolve
some inequity previously introduced into the relationship between agent and victim.
Further development of this analysis can be found in the Appendix, see note 117 and
text accompanying notes 117-19 infra.
54. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974), has
not disturbed this part of the Fuentes holding.
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Case B: The official acts on behalf of the state itself, claiming a
remedial justification pertaining to the state, and his action is an "affirmative" one such as a seizure of property, one which alters a status
quo so as to restore a (claimed) previous equitable position. The applicability of DPDP follows a fortiori from Fuentes, inasmuch as state
action is even more clearly involved.
Case C: This resembles Case B except that, instead of acting affirmatively, the official withholds some demanded performance, refusing to disturb an existing situation on purportedly remedial
grounds. Suppose, for example, that the official refuses a money payment assertedly due under a contract for services, on grounds of material breach or set-off of damages for breach. Has the official violated
DPDP rights by failing to set up a fair hearing prior to the ostensible due date? One might want to avoid this question by noting that
the citizen's civil action to enforce the contract fulfills all the purposes
of the DPDP fair hearing.55 But a knotty theoretical problem remains. What if there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity to
contract actions, no Tucker Act56 or analogous state legislation? This
question can be handled in the following way: Given the constitutional
right of DPDP as propounded in the Fuentes, Roth, and Sindermann
cases, either (i) allowance in such a case of a sovereign-immunity defense would have to be conceived as a matter of "substantive" lawwould have to be a way of saying that enforcement of this promise
by a state official is not legally available even though an analogous
private promise would have been enforceable as a matter of general, private law57 - or else (ii) if the defense is conceived as a challenge to
the court's competence, as distinguished from a denial of substantive
liability, then allowing the defense will violate DPDP rights unless
the official can point to some other forum in which a judicial or
55. That is, it fulfills all the purposes which can now be achieved by a judicial
determination that the failure to grant a prior hearing was wrongful. Judicial relief
now does differ from receipt of a prior hearing in that payment has been delayed; but
a judicious award of interest can minimize that difference.
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1970).
57. Such a "substantive" conception of official immunity seems to be reflected in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1638 (1974). See also The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419,
433 (1922) (Holmes, J.): "The United States has not consented to be sued for torts,
and therefore it cannot be said that in a legal sense the United States has been guilty
of a tort .

. .

.

Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that

are seen in the law but are elusive to the grasp." This "positivist" view of sovereign
immunity is discussed and questioned in P. BAToR, P. MisuKiN, D. SHAPnRo, H. WEcHsLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FFDERAL SYSTEM 1343-44
(rev. ed. 1973).
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A substantive rule withhold-

ing all the sanctions of contract law from promises made by officials on
the state's behalf would not contradict the DPDP rule that insofar as legal entitlements do exist vis-h-vis officials and the state, some adequate judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal must be available for vindicating those entitlements. Under the DPDP rule, the citizen is entitled to
an adjudication of his claim in some reasonably accessible tribunalalthough that adjudication may go off on a "substantive" conclusion
of no liability because of "sovereign immunity."59 A sovereign immunity
defense, which totally excludes a fair hearing on the question of justification, once a legally cognizable injury is asserted, cannot be reconciled with the DPDP rule. Indeed I shall argue below that it might be
a concern with just such special claims of sovereign or official nonaccountability which would explain why the constitutional guaranty of
58. The adequacy of the hearing opportunity would always be subject to judicial
review. Cf. Comment, supra note 8, at 580. Thus in cases such as Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), and Malone v. Bowdoin, 369
U.S. 643 (1962), where government officers successfully resisted claims for specific relief on sovereign immunity grounds, it may have been crucially important that the
plaintiffs had available to them the alternative recourse, under the Tucker Act, of suing
for damages for breach of contract or a "taking" of their property. See id. at 647 &
n.8; 337 U.S. at 703-04 & n.27; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1970); cf. L. JAFFE, JuDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIvE ACTION 208 (1965):
While the Privy Council sought some of the advantages of sovereign immunity in insisting on separate [internal] organs for administrative review, its
objective was not immunity [denial of hearing] as such-remedies for grievances were still available-but escape from control of another governmental
body [the courts]. If this was immunity, it was only such in degree, perhaps
comparable to Bacon's insistence on Chancery as a more suitable court for
the King than were the ordinary common law courts.
But what do we say when the aggrieved citizen in a case like Larson or Malone
claims a legally protected interest in regaining or retaining possession of the specific
assets in dispute (relief not available under the Tucker Act)-perhaps on the ground
that there is no "public purpose" to support a "taking" of this property by these officers? From the Larson opinion (337 U.S. at 690), it appears that sovereign immunity
would not prevent adjudication of this claim. Moreover, I cannot see why the logic
of Fuentes and Sindermann would not augur success should the citizen 3n this case sue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), to restrain the violation of his procedural due process
rights which occurs when government officers occupy his property without allowing
him to be heard on the "public purpose" question. (I do not, by that statement, mean
to have addressed the immense problem of what happens if less than $10,000 is in controversy.)
59. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 210, 215-16, 219-20 (1882) (mere assertion of "substantive" sovereign immunity defense does not foreclose judicial jurisdiction to determine the merits of that defense). If the defense claimed is that the government has provided another tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction to try claims against
the government or its officers, the court should adjudicate that defense on the meritsmeaning, particularly, that the court should determine whether the alternative tribunal's
formats and procedures meet the standards of procedural due process.
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DPDP is written in terms limiting the guaranty's application to deprivations by states.6 0
Case D: The state official invokes a nonremedial justification,
while admitting that his action was a legal cause of violation of a legally protected interest. For example, the official has destroyed goods
in the citizen's possession on the ground -that otherwise they would
have fallen into the hands of an enemy power. Although a theoretical argument can be presented which might limit DPDP rights to contexts of remedial justification,"1 it seems most unlikely that a contemporary court or commentator would seriously try to differentiate cases of
remedially motivated official action from other cases of officially de62
signed harm to legally protected interests, for DPDP purposes.
Case E: The state official, while admitting that his conduct caused
violation of a legally protected interest, further says that he has no justification at all-that he has purported to make no judgment whatsoever about the circumstances, traits, past behavior, or deserts of the
adversely affected citizen, that therefore there was no occasion for any
"fair hearing" (since there would have been nothing at issue in such a
hearing) and consequently there can have been no violation of a right
of DPDP. The absurdity of the official's claim seems immediately
apparent, though we may experience some difficulty in articulating
why we find it absurd. Perhaps it is enough to suggest that this
case is just the extreme or limiting example of a case in which the official claims a remedial or nonremedial justification and the claimed
63
justification turns out to fail on the merits.
Case F: The official, admitting that his conduct caused legally
cognizable injury to the citizen, says that the conduct (if wrongful at
all) was negligent rather than intentional, that therefore there was no
occasion for a prior fair hearing, etc., etc. But the citizen is now demanding performance of some remedial obligation-an obligation based
on operation of law-and why doesn't the official's refusal to perform
that obligation itself create an occasion for a fair hearing? If the official claims that his official status screens him from liability based on
his negligence, we are back to Case C: either that is a defense on the
merits as to which the citizen has a DPDP right to an adjudication,
60. See notes 80-81 infra and accompanying text.
61. See Appendix, note 117 and text accompanying notes 117-19 infra.
62. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Cafeteria Workers Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
63. Compare Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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or it is a jurisdictional defense and as such is overcome by the constitutional guaranty of DPDP unless a fair hearing is available elsewhere.
Case G: The official denies that he has done anything which
caused legally cognizable injury to the citizen: by this he means either
that the citizen has in fact sustained no harm; or that any harm which
the citizen has sustained was not "within the risk" contemplated by any
legal rule restricting the official's discretion-i.e., that there is no relevant rule intended to protect that sort of citizen against that sort of
harm; or that his (the official's) conduct was not a legal cause of
harm to the citizen. For any or all of these reasons, says the official,
there is no basis for a justification demand and so no occasion for a
fair hearing. The discussion of Case F suggests why, despite these
contentions, the citizen is entitled by DPDP to a fair hearing on the
issues, raised by the official, of harm in fact, "risk" or "duty," or legal cause.
The key to the argument is that procedural due process is itself
an entitlement established by the Constitution-a "master" or "second
order" entitlement-an entitlement that officials shall submit to judicial or quasi-judicial review of their questioned conduct. Like entitlements generally, this one is not an absolute claim, but it is a claim
which may not lawfully be refused without justification. Officials are
not legally free, at their unrestricted discretion, to refuse review. The
conduct of refusing review itself causes a legally cognizable injury, triggering a demand for justification. Here justification includes such assertions as: The person seeking review has suffered no harm, or
no harm, against which any relevant legal rule was meant to give
protection, or no harm which was legally caused by the questioned
conduct. Any or all of these justifications may be true, but their
truth is not established by their mere assertion. Like justifications
generally, -their truth is a mater for adjudication or quasi-adjudication
at the behest of the citizen asserting the due process entitlement. The
citizen thus can be seen as pressing his demand in two stages: in the
first stage, he demands justification for refusal of a second-stage hearing on his underlying demand for justification of the specific, official
conduct which, he says, caused a legally cognizable injury to him.
If, but only if, it is determined that there is no justification for refusing
the first-stage demand, the second-stage hearing ensues. Of course, because the issues of injury, risk, duty, cause, and justification may be
closely intertwined and indeed inseparable,64 the two stages may in
practice collapse into one proceeding. For my purposes the essential
64. See notes 45, 47 supra.
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point is that a proceeding there must be, if the citizen demands it; and
second-stage relief must be forthcoming unless either a first-stage or a
second-stage justification for refusal is established. 65
b.

The Private Civil Action as a (Quasi)
Due Process "FairHearing"

I have conceded from the beginning that the state does not commit a constitutionally forbidden deprivation when a private agent unjustifiably violates an entitlement--commits a tort, breach of contract,
breach of trust, or whatever. But I insist, too, that it can only be this
"state action" gap, and nothing else, which separates the fair-hearing
rights of private civil plaintiffs from those of persons, including civil
defendants generally, whose entitlements are violated or threatened
with violation by state officials.
The effect of dispensing with the state action qualification would
be that violation by anyone of a legal entitlement, coupled with denial of a fair-hearing opportunity, would also violate the constitutional
due process right; from which it would follow that every civil action
would be either (i) itself the "fair hearing" constitutionally owed to
the victim, or (ii) judicial review of a previous, quasi-judicial fair
hearing, or (iii) barred by former adjudication. In short, every nisi
prius civil action, unless it constitutes an attempt to relitigate a claim,
is a method of vindicating quasi-due process rights-due process rights
which would prevail but for the textual "state action" qualification on
such rights.
Suppose that the "state action" qualification on DPDP rights has
been swept away-so that the clause, in effect, reads: "No person, shall
deprive another person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law." Now imagine that a person suffering legally cognizable injury and wishing to pursue the claim through litigation, but finding the
ordinary courts for some reason inaccessible,6 6 adopts the following tactic: He initiates a "civil rights" action (as I shall call it) claiming an
65. Readers may notice a resemblance between what I have called first-stage justifications--no harm in fact, no harm within the scope of intended legal protection, no
adequate causal relationship between harm and questioned conduct-and the issues traditionally examined under the heading of "standing" to question administrative action.
It has never been doubted that "standing" is a question upon which the citizen seeking
review is entitled to adjudication; and the inseparability of "standing" issues from "merits" issues--of first-order from second-order justifications-is powerfully demonstrated
by Albert, supra note 50.
66. The barrier might be an access fee. Or, imaginably, it might be some combination of rules regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, venue, and service of process making it impossible to find any tribunal competent to handle a particular case.
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unconstitutional deprivation of liberty or property without due process,
rather than basing a claim for relief directly on the substantive law allegedly protecting his violated interest.67 If the defendant cannot
truthfully deny that his conduct violated an entitlement of the plaintiff (and there has as yet been no fair hearing and no fair hearing is
available elsewhere), the defendant's only course is to admit the due
process violation while denying any violation of substantive rights and
counter-claiming for relief identical to that to which he has already (as
it were) helped himself. The typical result would be adjudication of
whether the defendant's action was legally justified under the applicable substantive law, accompanied by appropriate restoration or
compensation to the plaintiff if, but only if, the decision on the merits
goes against the defendant.
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff's substantive complaint
against the defendant is that the latter has maintained an actionable
nuisance for the preceding two months, causing both a medical injury to the plaintiff's person and a continuing impairment of use and
enjoyment of the plaintiffs land. Having had no prior hearing, the
plaintiff charges a due process violation. He asks for money damages
for both types of injury, as well as an injunction against continuation of the alleged nuisance. The defendant admits, denies, and coun•terclaims as indicated above. If the court determines that the defendant has done and is doing nothing which is a legal cause of legally
cognizable injury to the plaintiff, then it enters judgment for the defendant because no fair-hearing duty ever arose. Otherwise, without yet
reaching the question of whether the defendant's activity was legally
justified, the court addresses itself to the question whether the defendant has ever afforded a fair-hearing opportunity to the plaintiff. If the
answer is "no," the court concludes: (a) as to the future, the defendant should be enjoined until such time as he initiates and prevails in a
fair hearing; but since the defendant's counterclaim is, in effect, a request to make this very action into the requisite fair hearing, the court
will now decide the question of legal justification for the defendant's
conduct and grant or deny the injunction accordingly;08 (b) as to the
67. I simply assume that there exists some accessible court which is competent to
adjudicate the federal constitutional claim. There may well be a state court with the
requisite competence. As presently written, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) might not
cover this "civil rights" claim (Who has committed a violation or deprivation "under
color of state law"?), so that the only statutory basis of federal district court jurisdiction would be 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) with its requirement that $10,000 be in controversy.
68. Again, I merely assume that the tribunal is competent to adjudicate this counterclaim for declaratory relief, perhaps through pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.
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past, the defendant has violated the plaintiff's due process rights by

causing him legally cognizable harm without first having set up a fairhearing opportunity, and the defendant should be required to compen-

sate the plaintiff for that due process violation. But (the defendant
should contend) the due process violation is a legal cause of only those

losses which would have been avoided by the defendant's timely performance of his fair-hearing duty. This excludes losses caused by activity which would have been held legally justified at a fair hearing

had one been held, and requires the court in this retrospective portion
of the "civil rights" action to adjudicate the question of legal justifica-

tion in order to determine the existence and extent of the defendant's
liability in damages.6 9
Thus the net result of the plaintiff's "civil rights" action closely coincides with what the plaintiff could have achieved simply by alleging
his ordinary substantive claim in an ordinary court, had one been ac-

cessible.

In other words, ordinary civil actions are a method of vindi-

cating quasi-due process rights, at least in cases in which defendants

admit having acted in a way which violated an entitlement. But what
of cases in which the defendant says that no entitlement was ever vio-

lated, or that no conduct of his was a legal cause of any such violation? Of course, the defendant's merely saying this would not suffice
to establish that the plaintiff's quasi-due process rights were not at

stake; that would be established only by an adjudication upholding the
69. But cf. Horton v. Orange County Bd. of Educ., 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972).
In regard to the "continuing" harm to use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land,
the defendant might want to point out that once the harm-causing activity became apparent to the plaintiff, the plaintiff could have filed one of these "civil rights" actions
alleging unconstitutional deprivation without due process (the plaintiff couldn't have
filed an ordinary civil action, under our assumption that ordinary courts are inaccessible). From that point on (the defendant would continue) a fair hearing was available to the plaintiff, and, therefore, the defendant has violated fair-hearing duties only
as to the first, visible instant of the harmful activity. The plaintiff's rejoinder is that
with each passing instant of continuation of the harm, the defendant has, in effect, decided anew to harm the plaintiff and so has repeatedly violated the fair-hearing duty.
In regard to the traumatic harm, the defendant might want to claim (if the evidence is supportive) that this was neither intended, nor foreseen, nor reasonably foreseeable; and that he cannot, therefore, be charged with violation of a fair-hearing duty
by failure to seek a judicial declaration of rights before the injury occurred. The plaintiff's rejoinder is standard procedural due process fare, and logically irrefutable: if the
circumstances make it unreasonable or inapposite to demand a prior fair hearing, a subsequent fair hearing looking toward restoration or compensation is required instead.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1931); cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 92 S. Ct. 1633, 1656 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part): "Where the Court has rejected the need for a hearing prior to the initial 'taking,' a principal rationale has been that a hearing would be provided before the taking
became final."
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defendant's assertion. It is a fair hearing on the justification for the
defendant's denial of liability to submit to a hearing which the plaintiff is now, in effect, demanding-and which his ordinary civil action
70
will supply.
Now I want to enter a caveat and disclaimer: Taken by itself, the
argument of this section might seem bent upon a conclusion that a genuine duty reposes on each person never to commit any act which
would foreseeably lead to violation of another's entitlements, without
first obtaining a judicial declaration that the act would be legally justified. I do not, of course, believe that any such duty exists. The argument in this section proceeds from a deliberately false premise-i.e.,
that the constitutional fair-hearing duty is charged to all persons rather
than only to states-and is not designed to stand by itself. It is,
rather, a piece of a larger argument which contends that states-not
private defendants-are duty-bound to ensure that anyone claiming
to have suffered a legally cognizable injury can receive a fair hearing
on his claim.
c.

"State Action"
Like most other constitutional duties, the duty to provide fair hearings is imposed only on states and their officials, not upon private
agents. Such a duty on the part of states could be limited to disputes in which the alleged violators of legal entitlements are state officials, or it could extend to cases in which such violations are charged
against private persons. I have already conceded, arguendo, that the
more limited reading is the easier to reconcile with the text of the fourteenth amendment due -process clause; and accordingly, that the strict,
literal constitutional right to stateprovided fair hearings applies only
in cases of state-authored substantive deprivations. 71 But the interest
in having the state provide fair hearings in cases of privately authored
deprivations might nevertheless be a "fundamental" or "constitutionally
protected" one. 72 In support of just that conclusion, I propose to show

that (i) in terms of the purposes served and the interests affected by
the state's fair-hearing duty, there is no persuasive explanation of why
that duty should be limited to cases of deprivations by state officials;
and (ii) the most satisfying explanation of the amendment's use of the
phrase "No state" rather than "No person" in regard to its procedural
70. Compare Case G, at text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
71. See text accompanying note 38 supra. The textual issue might look different
in regard to the fifth amendment because of the latter's use of passive voice. But it
hardly seems worthwhile here to question the conventional assumption that fifth

amendment guaranties are conditioned on a "governmental action" requirement precisely analogous to that of the fourteenth amendment.
72. See notes 14-20, 4344 supra and accompanying text.
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due process guaranty is that .the framers simply assumed the availability
of fair hearings when deprivations were charged against private persons. 7a
How could one explain a constitutional text which, while broadly
requiring the state to provide fair hearings upon claims of violations
of legally protected interests of all sorts, limits the guaranty to cases in
which state officials are charged with the violations? Why would our
entitlements vis-a-vis state officials be given this special concern?
There comes to mind the possibility of an explanation paralleling
one which has been suggested for the state-action qualification on constitutional rights such as those to equal treatment regardless of race
and freedom of speech and association: to recognize such rights vis-hvis other private citizens might be to limit their freedom unduly, whereas no such objection can arise to imposition of a duty on someone in
his capacity as a public official.74 Though the burden of staging fair
hearings would fall only on the state, and not on any private person,
it must be recognized that a fair hearing staged by the state can have
onerous consequences for the private adversary, who will have to appear and defend, perhaps at considerable monetary and emotional cost;
and these burdens might be analogized to the losses of individual privacy which would be occasioned by allowing free speech or anti-discrimination rights to run against all persons in all circumstances, as a
reason why framers might have guaranteed fair-hearing rights against
public officials but not against private citizens. That is, one might
somehow associate the Constitution's restriction of the fair-hearing
guaranty to cases of state-authored deprivations with a recognition that
it might be bad for private citizens to have to go about their daily lives
under constant apprehension of being sued.
Such a comparison of the fair-hearing guaranty with the freespeech and anti-discrimination guaranties does not withstand close
scrutiny. There seem to be two interconnected reasons for differentiating between public officials and private citizens in regard to free
speech and anti-discrimination duties: First, while persons acting in
their official capacities seem to have no significant interest, or no interest worth protecting, in being allowed to suppress or discriminate in
the ways forbidden by the Constitution, the same cannot be said of
persons acting as private citizens;7 second, a constitutional free
speech or anti-discrimination guaranty applicable to private as well as
73. This is not a claim about the facts of history, but about the logic of the situation.
74. See Part I at 1204-05.
75. Cf. Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 100-03 (1967).
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governmental action would prevent legislatures and courts from working out suitable accommodations of social equality and free speech
values with competing values of privacy and individual autonomy traditionally ascribed to the institution of private ownership. 70 Neither
reason seems to justify differentiating between public officials and
private citizens when we come to consider a constitutional guaranty
of fair hearings. It is hardly self-evident that framers would be more
concerned about securing private citizens than public officials against
fear of being sued. To be sued as an official may be no less emotionally distressing than to be sued as a private person, and no less
fraught with risk of undesired consequences (for example, tarnished
reputation or blighted career prospects); and the threat of such suits
may be as damaging to boldness and efficiency in the public service as
in private enterprise. Moreover, a fair-hearing guaranty broadly applicable to cases of private as well as governmental deprivations would
in no way prevent legislatures and courts from giving as much weight
as they judge desirable to the social and personal interest in freedom
from burdensome fears about being sued. Legislatures and courts
can always achieve the desired balances through their definitions of
legally cognizable injury and legal cause. 77 Once those definitions
are fixed, it is they which create zones of legally risky conduct and generate any burdensome apprehensions about becoming subject to suit.
Constitutional protection for the fair-hearing rights of persons claiming
to have suffered injury from such risky conduct is not a significant
additional source of apprehension; such protections merely reduce the
likelihood that a person subjected to such apprehension by the substantive law will be able to escape liability which the law presumably
means to make him apprehensive about. That seems most particularly
true of the specific manifestation of constitutional protection for the
fair-hearing right for which I am here arguing-protection against denial of hearing by exclusionary access fees.
But how, then, might we explain why the constitutional protection for fair-hearing rights is verbally conditioned on violations of entitlements by state officials? The most satisfactory rationalization I
can think of is simply that framers would not worry about the problem
except in regard to claims against public officials. They would naturally assume that in all other cases recourse could be had through
judicial or quasi-judicial forums spontaneously provided by the state itself.78 In fact, the supposed availability of such recourse seems to be
76. See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); PartI at 1204-05.
77. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
78. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17, 24 (1883), the Supreme Court justi-
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most or all of what it means, in our legal culture, to say that a legally

cognizable injury has occurred.79 But perhaps framers could remain apprehensive that state officials on occasion would, perhaps
even with legislative authorization, act in contradiction of extant legal (including constitutional) entitlements while refusing to submit
to judicial or quasi-judicial review of their actions . 0 The constitu-

tional guaranty of procedural due process, then, can perhaps be rationalized as a response to the spectre of totally exclusionary "jurisdictional" invocations of official immunity; and that would explain why

the guaranty is written with specific reference to deprivations by the
state.8 '
fied its limiting construction of the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection guaranties by reference to just such an assumption:
[The Negroes' legal] rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress . . . . [These rights are]
properly cognizable by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to redress by those laws ....
Compare Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STA-N. L. Rav. 3, 16-17 (1961).
79. Compare note 57 supra and text accompanying notes 6-7, supra.
80. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), where the government contended that the fourth amendment
merely limited the extent to which federal agents could defend against a state law tort
suit by asserting that their actions constituted a valid exercise of federal power. Id. at
390-91. The majority rejected this argument on the ground that the fourth amendment
proscribes a broader range of action than simply such conduct as would be actionable
under state law. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 194-95 (1961) (Harlan, I.,
concurring).
81. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Dunham, Due Process and
Commercial Lai, 1972 Sup. Cr. R v. 135, 150-52; Albert, supra note 50, at 444:
"[A] private citizen does not commit a trespass if he demands and is granted admission to one's home, since the homeowner may lock the door or call the police.
This immunity, however, cannot be extended to consent extracted by a police officer
in this manner.'"
The argument can be illustrated by the case of repossession of chattel security from
a supposedly defaulting conditional vendee. The vendee's continued possession of the
chattel is "property"--an "entitlement"--in the DPDP sense that under the local substantive law it would be a legal wrong to the vendee for anyone to intrude upon his
possession unless there exists some objectively verifiable justification such as default.
See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra. Under Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), if state officers seize the security without granting a fair-hearing opportunity,
they thereby violate the DPDP guaranty irrespective of whether there has actually been
a default. See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). Granting
arguendo that a private creditor's self-help seizure, sans hearing, would not violate the
DPDP guaranty, what reason can we give to explain the discrepancy?
To say that a debtor's continued possession is DPDP-protected "property"--that
unjustified interference is a legal wrong under local law-is virtually to say that debtors can obtain redress against unjustified private seizures in some state tribunal, so that
a constitutional fair-hearing guaranty would seem redundant. But there is no such appearance of redundancy in the case of seizure by state officials: were it not for the
DPDP guaranty, one could easily imagine that state officials might be declared immune
from having to justify their entitlement-violating acts in any state tribunal. (Congress

556
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It seems that only by assuming the availability of state judicial
or quasi-judicial forums, unencumbered by notions of official immunity, to provide fair hearings of legal grievances against private parties, can one explain a constitutional fair-hearing guaranty limited to
grievances against officials. There just is no other satisfying explanation for the state action qualification on a procedural due process
guaranty having the otherwise expansive application confirmed by the
Fuentes and Sindermann cases. The ends pursued by procedural due
process are, then, at stake whenever the state would totally deny a fair
hearing to a citizen alleging a "good" cause of action. The plaintiff's
access to such a hearing is, therefore, if not a part of procedural due
process itself, a "preferred freedom" or "fundamental interest" condid not go that far in section 6 of the Lloyd-La-Folette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
Had it done so, six justices would have considered such action unconstitutional. See
Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974), discussed in note 52 supra.). Could the state
maintain an official-immunity scheme against DPDP attack by, for example, "substantively" conditioning all possessory entitlements on the continuing, discretionary tolerance of certain officials, so that seizure by those officials could never violate the entitlement as thus defined and so would never have to be objectively justified, and, accordingly, could never trigger a fair-hearing demand? It seems extremely unlikely that any
state would wish to establish such a doctrine as part of its substantive law. Even if
some state did so choose, it seems that serious questions would be raised under the
"delegation" (as distinguished from the fair-hearing) aspect of the due process guaranty.
See, eg., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 270 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Such a view of the DPDP guaranty-as directed against state attempts to immunize public officials from having to submit their justifications for entitlement-violating
actions to impartial examination in fair hearings--may invite the objection that it fails
to explain why due process should sometimes be read, as in Fuentes, to impose an affirmative duty upon state officials though not private agents to stage fair hearings before they proceed with their encroachments upon legally protected interests. But see
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). Since extension to private
entitlement-violators of the affirmative duty to instigate a prior hearing would not
be merely redundant of what is already implied by the entitlement's existence, perhaps the redundancy notion fails to explain why the DPDP guaranty applies only
to deprivations by state officials. But if extension of an affirmative, prior-hearing
requirement to private agents would not be precisely redundant, it might very well be
either fruitless or intolerable. How could the system hope to enforce an affirmative
obEgation on the part of all persons to instigate a fair hearing before proceeding to
violate any entitlement, except through after-the-fact, retrospective proceedings and
remedies, more or less paralleling those which could be obtained in civil actions
founded directly on the entitlement-creating local law? (See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.) Laws purporting to authorize public officials to commit deprivations without prior hearings can be judicially declared invalid; defined classes of public
officials can, as found necessary from time to time, be judicially enjoined from thus
proceeding; it is even quite possible to fashion general punitive sanctions to prevent
public officials from flouting an affirmative, prior-hearing duty. But injunctions cannot
issue against the general public; and it is easily understandable that constitutional
draftsmen would look with disfavor upon the imposition of an affirmative, prior-hearing
duty upon private persons, which could not be effectively enforced otherwise than by
exposing us all to the risk of punishment (not merely compensatory sanctions) whenever we violate civil entitlements without having first instigated fair hearings.
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tained within substantive due process liberty. That an out-of-court,
voluntary settlement may be attainable is of no consequence. Nor does
it matter in the least that the interest for which legal protection is
claimed "does not rise to the... constitutional level."82
Speaking with utmost precision, the right of litigation access to
which the argument in this section directly points is not, necessarily, a
right of access to every judicial forum which would be open to a moneyed disputant in otherwise similar circumstances-or even of any access at all to a tribunal commonly or formally styled a "court." What
the argument directly points to is a right to at least one "fair hearing" on the merits of one's claims, before a judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal characterized by the independence and neutrality of its decision-maker and its use of -adversary procedures (or else of some other
procedures which allow the claimant both to communicate his own contentions effectively and to secure a thorough probing of his adversary's.
contentions). The argument does not-at least directly-establish
any claim to having one's claims heard and disposed of before a "judicial" as distinguished from an "administrative" body, or by a "judge"
as distinguished from a "hearing officer"; nor does it establish any
claim to appeal or to judicial review, once a fair hearing has been
83
received.
Of course, there may be subsidiary arguments which would succeed in expanding the due process-inspired access right to mean specifically access to court (where judicial jurisdiction exists) and beyond
that to include a right to appeal (where appeal would normally be
available). Would not serious questions be raised by a state's attempt to maintain two noticeably different sets of nisi prius tribunals,
one of which charged access fees while the other was available to
functionally indigent claimants (and also, perhaps, to anyone else
who preferred not to pay fees)? The indigent claimant is entitled to
a "fair" hearing opportunity. Precisely how does the hearing he can
obtain in the "free" tribunal vary from that offered in the nisi prius
court of general jurisdiction? Do these variations spell the difference
between a hearing opportunity which is fair and one which isn't? If
not, why does the state bother to maintain the fee-restricted tribunalwhich is presumably more expensive to operate? (If it isn't more expensive, why does it charge fees while the other tribunal doesn't?) I
82. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973). See Part I at 1160.
83. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 462 n.5 (1973) (Marshall, J.,dissenting); Comment, supra note 8, at 588-89. Thus the decision in Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656 (1973)-though by no means all of the per curiam opinion's reasoningcan be reconciled with the argument in this section. See id. at 659-60 & n.4. Cf.
Comment, supra, at 589-90.
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do not suggest that these questions will necessarily be unanswerable;
but they probably will not be easy to answer. The same arguments are
relevant when the question is that of access to an appealA 4
B.

GOVERNMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COURT

AccEss FEES
1.

The Doctrines

The notion of litigation access as a fundamental interest or preferred freedom can be regarded as a doctrinal weapon to be wielded
against various governmental practices cramping the exercise or enjoyment of that interest, such as the practice of charging filing fees that
have the effect of totally excluding whoever cannot afford to pay
them. Still, the question remains whether there might be some sufficient governmental justification for maintaining a filing fee schedule
and applying it even to the indigent.
Distinguishable, though overlapping, governmental objectives
which might be served by court filing fees seem to include: (1) assurance that the plaintiff has something at stake which is of palpable
and particular, as distinguished from merely abstract and theoretical,
concern to him-that a genuine "case or controversy" exists and that
policies opposed to judicial rendition of advisory opinions will be respected; (2) prevention of litigation where the practical stakes are so
small, or the probabilities of victory so remote, as not to be worth the
social resources consumed by the litigation process; (3) protection of
defendants against harassment by "vexatious" litigation; (4) produc84. For indications of how the suggested line of questions might be answered, see
Ross v. Moffit 42 U.S.L.W. 4940 (U.S. June 16, 1974). In addition, of course, one
might want to try the approach of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), arguing that
to divert the claims of functionally indigent persons to one of a pair of tribunals between
which others are free to choose, or to deny functionally indigent persons appeals which
are accessible to others, constitutes invidious discrimination by wealth forbidden by the
equal protection clause. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 388-89 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Ross v. Moffit, supra, bodes ill for this line of argument,
although the possibility remains open that the Court would distinguish between refusal
of free counsel and imposition of exclusionary fees. It is unclear whether or how
far the Griffin equal protection theory will be extended beyond the procedural claims
of criminal defendants. Following the lead of the Rodriguez opinion, it might be
hard for an indigent civil claimant who had been granted a fair quasi-judicial hearing, but been denied access to a trial-level or appellate court, to persuade the Supreme Court that he had suffered "an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy [the] benefit" of a due-process hearing. 411 U.S. at 20. It is true
that the logic of Griffin would allow narrower description of the benefit in question,
as an opportunity to be heard before a particular tribunal. Yet the Rodriguez opinion
explicitly treats Griffin as a "criminal" case, see 411 U.S. at 17-18, 20-22. On the
other hand, the argument which would justify confinement of the Griffin theory to
criminal contexts remains unclear. See Brickman, supra note 31, at 608-09. See also
text accompanying notes 104-06 infra.
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tion of revenue for the state treasury; (5) allocative efficiency in the
economy, achieved by "internalizing" costs to those who stand to bene-

fit from the costly activities.8 5
The first three objectives share a common core of concern with
screening out frivolous, unworthy, or objectionable uses of the state's
judicial system. But, as the Supreme Court has several times recognized in analogous contexts, 6 the screen provided by flat fees is too

crude-too coarse-grained in some respects, too fine-grained in others
-to

withstand the demands for "close fit" and "least restrictive alter-

to regulate
natives" which always arise when government undertakes
87
interest.
of
right
protected
a
of
enjoyment
or
exercise
Frivolity, after all, is a matter of degree. So, too, is the deterrent

effect of a modest, flat fee-which almost certainly varies inversely
with the wealth and income of the prospective litigant.

Thus, com-

mon sense advises, the wealthy will be deterred only haphazardly;
the functionally indigent will be totally "deterred" (if such an odd
use of the word is allowable); and the in-between will be deterred

to an extent. Modest, flat fees make no dependable contribution to
dissuading the affluent from theoretical or extortionate litigation; but

they can make it absolutely impossible for the indigent to litigate in
good faith.

"Deterrence," in any acceptable sense of that term, can

be depended upon to operate only on that group of citizens to whom,
say, fifty dollars will seem neither a prohibitive sum nor, on the other

hand, a trifling amount to pay for the privilege of demanding one's
88
rights.
Moreover, the government has available to it alternative means
for controlling abusive resort to the courts-means which plainly are
closer-fitting than flat fees and, at least as applied to the functionally

indigent, are also plainly less restrictive of the exercise of litigation
rights.

The most obvious possibility is increased reliance on pre-

trial screening of individual cases.

No doubt this would be adminis-

85. Compare Brickman, supra note 31, at 638. As a matter of economic analysis,
goal (5) may seem to include goals (2) and (3). Yet it is clarifying for legal analysis to distinguish between the all-encompassing goal of efficiency which can be achieved
only through a system of "general" or "market" deterrence, and goals cast narrowly
enough-in terms of preventing specific "abuses"--to be achievable through "specific'
or "collective" deterrence. For the terminology of general and specific deterrence, see
generally G. CALAanEsI, TbB CosTs OF AccmniNrs: A LwAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY51 (1970); Michelman, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 661-66 (1971).
86. Cf. Lubin v. Panish, 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
145-46 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971); Comment, supranote 8, at 584.
87. See e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
88. See Brickman, supra note 31, at 639.
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tratively more difficult and expensive than simple reliance on flat fees.
Yet any increased costs might well be of that modest or middling magnitude which the Supreme Court would categorize as "administrative
convenience" or "efficiency," considerations which the Court has repeatedly said cannot alone justify governmental restriction of enjoy89
ment of protected rights or interests.
We come now to the fourth primary objective-that of raising
revenue for the state treasury. Perhaps court filing fees can be explained simply as a general revenue measure, an excise imposed
upon the activity of resorting to the tribunals of justice. But if access
to those tribunals is, as I have argued, a constitutionally recognized and
protected interest, then the Supreme Court's decisions in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania,9" Grosjean v. American Press Co.,9" and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,9" indicate that an excise which is specially focussed on enjoyment of the protected fair-hearing interest, and in that
sense discriminates against such enjoyment, may well be invalid even as
applied to persons able to pay the fee.9"
However, as first indicated in Cox v. New Hampshire,94 and recently confirmed in the air-passenger fee case, Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,95 reliance on the
unconstitutional-excise analysis is perilous where the exaction is imposed on those who voluntarily seek access to a state-supported facility. In such circumstances, even where access is sought in pursuit of a
constitutionally favored interest, the Supreme Court has sometimes allowed the exaction to be justified as a resource-allocating user charge,
despite the appearance of rather extreme crudity in the exaction when
measured by such a purpose.
This brings us to the fifth primary objective, that of perfecting
the allocation of resources by assigning costs to those who choose to
incur them. The governmental interest in "resource allocation" is
89. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791, 799 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
90. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
91. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The Grosjean case, involving an excise on newspaper
publishing, may be distinguishable because of a discriminatory feature of the excise, indicating that it was actually aimed at disadvantaging certain, particular publishers. See
id. at 251.
92. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The "poll tax" invalidated in Harper was not an excise
on the activity of voting but a capitation tax payable irrespective of voting, see Harper
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 240 F. Supp. 270, 271 (E.D. Va. 1964), although
denial of voting privileges may have been the only sanction actually employed. Harper
thus may support the proposition in the text a fortiori, but supports it in any case.
93. See Willging, supra note 31, at 283-85.
94. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See Willging, supranote 31, at 284.
95. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
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really a congeries of distinguishable interests each of which could rationally be pursued for its own sake. There is, most obviously, an interest in efficiency-in devoting to each use of the judicial system just
as many dollars worth of resources, and no more, as cannot be otherwise deployed with a greater output of "welfare" (given the existing
distribution of income) .9

Quite distinct in principle from concerns

about efficiency, though for economic theorists happily intertwined with
them, is the interest in maintaining a "proper" distribution of income.
If each person must pay for each use of the justice system the true
marginal cost of that use, then the state's provision of justice d6es not
become a vehicle for underhanded disturbance of whatever distribu-

tion has otherwise been achieved.

Any desired adjustments of, say,

the "market" or "natural" distribution is left to explicit, deliberate legislative action.
Although what the Supreme Court did in the Cox and Evansville

cases apparently allows states to justify user-charge restriction of exercise of protected rights by reference to a resource-allocation interest,
the Court has not invariably been so permissive.

In Bullock v. Carter

the Court confronted Texas' argument that "since the candidates are
availing themselves of the primary machinery, it is appropriate that
they pay [in the form of flat filing fees, varied according to the office
sought] that share of the cost that they have occasioned. ' 97 In the
course of rejecting that argument, the Court said:
Viewing the myriad governmental functions supported from general
revenues, it is difficult to single out any of a higher order than the conduct of elections at all levels to bring forth those persons desired by their
fellow citizens to govern. Without making light of the State's interest in
husbanding its revenues, we fail to see such an element of necessity in
the State's present means of financing primaries as to justify the result93
ing incursion on the prerogatives of voters.
96. The previously discussed interest in deterring "frivolous" resort to judicial machinery is in part a cruder version of the interest in efficiency, and perhaps also in
part the embodiment of a moral concern about abusive or vexatious resort to judicial
process.
97. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1972). It is interesting to note that
the Court's order in Bullock invalidated the filing fee practice as a whole, not merely
the exclusionary application of the fee requirement to functionally indigent candidates;
that is, the Court affirmed a lower court decision which simply enjoined future enforcement, against anyone, of the filing fee requirements. Carter v. Wischkaemper, 321 F.
Supp. 1358, 1363 (N.D. Tex. 1970). Yet Chief Justice Burger's opinion often suggests
that exclusionary application of fees was the issue before the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
405 U.S. at 141-42 & n.17. That clearly was the issue in the recent case of Lubin
v.Panish, 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974). See also Johnston v. Luna, 338 F. Supp. 355 (N.D.
Tex. 1972).
98. 405 U.S. at 148-49. But cf. id. at 148 n.29.
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Texas, in short, could not treat a candidate's use of its electoral system
as a "commodity" to be sold only to those willing and able to pay the
cost.
May a state, then, treat use of its justice system that way? Is a
charge for costs occasioned by one's use of the justice system more
like such a charge for use of a publicly financed physical facility, as in
Cox and Evansville, or more like one for use of the electoral system as
in Bullock? One might think the electoral-system analogy the closer
one, insofar as it is true for both the justice system and the electoral
system, but not for the use of physical facilities, that the essence of the
claim resides in the general prospect of practically available access on
an equal or standard footing with every one else. 99 On the other hand,
court access may seem to resemble access to streets and airports in
posing a need to ration a limited facility susceptible to overcrowdinga need less evident in regard to access to the ballot, but still there when
we recall concern for the virtues of "short ballots." In any case,
the Bullock court was obviously concerned about protecting the access
of voters as well as that of candidates to the electoral system, reasoning that a likely effect of sizeable fee requirements would be to bias
the resulting pool of candidates in a manner disadvantageous to the
interests of a distinguishable group of voters. Thus a narrow statement of the Bullock Court's objection to general use of the fee requirements (and perhaps also of the Court's objection to exclusionary application of fees to functionally indigent candidates) might be that the
rights of voternv must not be made to depend on the willingness or
ability of candidatesto pay fees.
Bullock has undergone subsequent interpretation by the Supreme
Court which seems to make it a much surer precedent when we restrict focus to the question of exclusionary impact of filing fees on
functionally indigent candidates. On this question, Bullock has been
assimilated by the Court's commentary in Rodriguez'"0 into the com0
pany of Griffin v. Illinois.'1
Texas' resource-allocation argument in
Bullock was not enough to overcome the crucial facts (as the Court
viewed them in Rodriguez) that the fees "effectively barred all potential candidates who were unable to pay the required fee" and that
"inability to pay [thus] occasioned an absolute denial of a position on
the primary ballot." In context, these statements suggest concern about
violation of the interests of individual indigent candidates who were
effectively excluded by the fees. It is true ,that in its Rodriguez restate99. See text accompanying notes 26-36, supra.
100. 411 U.S. at 22.
101. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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ment of Bullock the Court also noted that the Texas fees were sizable,
"often running into the thousands of dollars,"'1 2 but it was never clear
why that fact should affect application of the effective-exclusion principle, as long as some would be "effectively barred" even by much
smaller fees; and Lubin v. Panish03 has now established that the
principle covers fees of any size.
The effective-exclusion principle was also, of course, invoked in
Boddle. Addressing "the State's asserted interest in its fee and cost
requirements as a mechanism of resource allocation or cost recoupment," Justice Harlan's Boddie opinion noted that "such a justification
was offered and rejected in Griffin v. Illinois," and concluded that "the
rationale of Griffin covers this case."' 4 Especially given the breadth
and lack of articulation of the rationale tendered in Griffin, there is
no apparent reason why it would not similarly cover any case in which
the exclusionary application of access fees to impecunious litigants
is treated as "suspect" because repugnant to the proposed constitutional
right of standard juridical access. In this connection, it is interesting
to contemplate the Court's remarks about the Griffin rationale in
Mayer v. Chicago:10 5 "Griffin does not represent a balance between

the needs of the accused and the interests of society; its principle is a
flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective
an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way
.... The State's fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant."' 10 6

2.

The Implications
In its Rodriguez opinion, relying upon Griffin and Bullock, the

Supreme Court indicated that the strict review which attends recognition of some "benefit" as essential to enjoyment of a constitutionally
favored interest includes, as one component, a demand for "compelling" justification whenever the state acts or organizes its affairs in
such a way that some persons, "because of their impecunity . . . [are]
completely unable to pay for . . . [that] benefit, and as a conse-

quence, they [sustain] an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit."' 1 7 A part of strict review, then,
102. 411 U.S. at 22.
103. 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974).
104. 401 U.S. at 382.
105. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
106. Id. at 196-97. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972): "Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible
interests; it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken."
107. 411 U.S. at 20.
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seems to be a very heavy presumption against exclusionary application
of state-imposed fees conditioning access to or enjoyment of constitutionally protected rights and interests.
Thus, if we take the Rodriguez dicta for all they are worth, we
can arrive at a proposition which to some may seem rather startling:
Constitutional designation of some personal interest, as one which merits special judicial solicitude against excessive governmental encroachment, is tantamount to a constitutional command that, at least insofar as the government acts as the exclusive source of benefits or services which directly support enjoyment of such an interest, it must provide those services free of charge to -the functionally indigent.'03 The
startling character of that proposition seems to be simply a reflection of
how thoroughly unaccustomed we are to think that anyone can be
entitled to receive costly benefits without paying for them.
Those who are startled will have to come to terms somehow with
the Boddie, Bullock, and Griffin decisions, as well as with the Rodriguez dicta. It might help if we could explain the startling doctrinethe heavy presumption against the exclusionary application of stateimposed fees conditioning enjoyment of constitutionally protected rights
-as merely an application of demands for "close fit" and "least
restrictive alternatives" which everyone seems to accept as appropriate
when governments would limit such enjoyment. But such an explanation, though initially appealing, proves to be difficult to sustain.
What resource-allocation purpose is served by exclusionary insistence upon a fee from a person who simply cannot afford to pay it?
The special attractiveness of fees-more broadly, prices-as resource
allocators lies in their unmatched power to elicit from those for whose
benefit costs may (or may not) be incurred the most reliable sort of
testimony as to whether the benefits are worth the costs. But no such
revelation ensues from attachment of a fee condition to provision of a
good or service to persons having no money or credit to spare. To
deduce, from a starving pauper's abstention from bread-buying, that
giving him a loaf would not yield benefits in excess of costs, is to
carry to an absurd extreme a normally healthy skepticism about interpersonal comparisons of utilities. In such a case, an, ad hoc collective
evaluation of the "worth" of a benefit to a claimant would not only be
less restrictive of the claimant's enjoyment of the benefit than would
be reliance on an exclusionary fee; ad hoc collective evaluation would
also tend strongly to be a somewhat more accurate resource-allocator
108. The question of affirmative governmental duty to assure that indigent persons
can procure such services from someone is real and important, but beyond the scope
of the present discussion. See Tribe, supranote 11, at 44-50.
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than the exclusionary fee, because an exclusionary fee is utterly without discriminating power."0 9
Yet it must be recognized that any collective-evaluation device
has its own administrative costs, and that these costs might be greatly
multiplied if the use of such devices to screen out unworthy claims
could not be confined to cases of functionally indigent persons but
rather would have to be extended to all litigants if applied to any.
Thus insofar as new collective-evaluation devices are introduced, and
the use of existing such devices is increased, to take up slack left by
abolition of exclusionary flat fees, it seems quite possible that an increase in administrative costs might result which could more than
offset any accompanying resource-allocation gains.
If a state were to argue along these lines for retention of a simple fee
system with no exceptions for the indigent, it might look as though the
argument would run into the Supreme Court's unwillingness to accept
"administrative convenience" and "efficiency" as excuses for a state's
not using the "closest-fitting," least "restrictive" means available to
achieve its valid objectives, when a constitutionally protected interest is
involved. 1 0 But can the Court maintain this position when the broad
goal of allocative efficiency is itself cited as the state's underlying
objective? Does the Court's position mean that the broad goal of allocative efficiency (as distinguished from more narrowly defined goals
of deterring specific abuses such as vexatious litigation) is utterly unavailable as a justification for governmental practices seriously impeding the exercise of protected rights? The answer to the last question
may well be "yes," but that might not render any less startling the implications of Boddie, Bullock, Griffin, and Rodriguez.

We can try another tack. imagine that the state offers the following defense of its insistence on pricing the use of its justice system and refusing to make exceptions for the indigent: "It is a mistake
to single out any particular good or service, from among all which are
available on the market, and then argue that the worth of that benefit
to a severely impoverished person is not accurately gauged by his offering price. That particular good or service is never the only one
which the indigent person wants or needs, and allowing .the price
system to operate even against him is the best way to discover what
his own priorities are, given the budgetary constraint imposed by his
109. "Collective" evaluation of the worth of a legal claim would mean evaluation
by some official agency, for example a court applying an "amount in controversy" minimum or a rule barring "frivolous" claims. The usage is derived from G. CALABRFs,
supra note 85, at 95-96.
110. See notes 87, 89 supraand accompanying text.
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unhappily low income. When someone speaks of a state of 'functional indigency,' and says that for persons in that state pricing works
obtusely as a resource allocator and ad hoe collective appraisals of comparative utilities would work better, what the speaker means is that
he thinks the net sum of social welfare would be higher if the 'functionally indigent' person had more purchasing power. Now the economically preferable way to redistribute purchasing power from the
better to the worse-off is by transfers in the form of money, not particular goods or services, because money allows the recipient who
knows best what he wants to spend his additional income as he
chooses. But the question of general monetary transfers must be left
up to the legislature; and if such transfers do not occur, or do not occur in the magnitudes that some would recommend, we can only conclude that the people of the state, speaking through the legislature, are
satisfied with the present distribution of income."
Thus there appears to be an economic goal which can provide
a close-fitting justification for the state's insistence on application of
court access fees even to its most impoverished citizens, a goal other
than the pursuit of allocative efficiency. This goal is the stabilization
of some supposedly preferred distributional outcome. In the Boddie,
Bullock and Griffin cases, and more generally in the Rodriguez dicta,
the Supreme Court can be understood as treating such a stabilization
goal, along with that of "administrative convenience," as one which
cannot justify a governmentally imposed restriction on the exercise or
enjoyment of a constitutionally protected right or interest. The very
making of that comparison suggests that the Justices may simply not
take the stabilization goal very seriously, perhaps because their observations and impressions of our political processes leave them seriously
doubtful that the distribution which results from the market as modified by legislated transfer programs is in any intelligible sense "preferred" to that which results if, say, indigents are granted free access
to the courts. Such doubts which would be all the more warranted insofar as the Constitution's intimations of special regard for an interest
such as that in litigation access are themselves to be supposed constitutive of societal preferences.
In the final analysis, I do not see how it can be denied that the
Supreme Court, in the decisions I have cited, has in effect been suggesting that the Constitution contains an itemized list of some of the
components of an ideal concept of minimum economic capacity.", So
111. Similar results follow from an analysis of the related concept of equal opportunity. See Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral
Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication,41 U. Cm. L. REv. 32 (1973).
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those who are startled may have reason to be startled. And all of
us can continue to ponder the puzzle, to which I have previously
called attention, of what the "state action" part of fourteenth amendment liability can possibly mean in the context of a constitutional purpose to specify the components, or some of them, of a "just minimum.""

12

C.

'CONCLUSION

I have presented a two-step argument for the proposition that
court access fees may not constitutionally be applied to those who cannot afford to pay them: first, there is a doctrine opposed to governmentally imposed fees which have the effect of excluding indigent persons from the enjoyment of constitutionally favored interests; second,
persons do have a constitutionally favored interest in a standing opportunity to avail themselves of whatever juridical processes are normally available to members of the community." 3
Now I am aware that these propositions, and others of their kind
carry in their train a riddle: How is it possible to provide effective
juridical access for the necessitous, by a fair method that assures
against the two related evils of prodigal or prohibitive expense andespecially-of over-compensating the necessitous at the expense of the
borderline poor, not to mention the so-called affluent? It is the riddle
of what to substitute for salutary economic deterrence, when use
of economic deterrence is constitutionally disallowed against the functionally indigent. 114 An imaginable answer, assuming that ,the attack
is confined to state-imposed access fees, would be that the problem
surely will not materialize as long as no public provision is made for
equipage." 5 Relief from access fees alone, it might be argued with
some plausibility, will open no floodgates of frivolous litigation. But
that answer would be merely facetious on the part of one who, like
myself, is not ready to deny that the right of effective access does truly
encompass provision for equipage, too (though whether or how the
courts should undertake enforcement of the equipage part of the right
is another question)."'
112. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 11, 13, 31-32, 39, 55-56 (1969).
113. Or at least persons have a constitutionally favored interest in receiving some
sort of fair hearing when they assert legal grievances. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
114. But it is not completely disallowed. See Fuller v. Oregon, 42 U.S.L.W. 4770
(U.S. May 20, 1974), upholding a "recoupment" scheme.
115. See PartI, at 1163.
116. For discussion of some possible justiciable handles on the problem, see Brickman, supra note 31, at 641-49.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1974:527

The fact may be that the deterrence problem is not fully soluble at
the level of constitutional adjudication, where courts decide whether
to recognize or not to recognize claimed constitutional rights. The
problem is thus intractable because it is, as it crops up in these contexts, a mere symptom of an underlying, for all I know ineradicable,
element in the organization of our society and, for all I know, of all
imaginable modem societies. That element is simply that some persons find themselves in the predicament of functional indigency.
That the existence of functional indigency is the key to the deterrence riddle may easily be seen. If there were no persons in that state,
there would be nothing in the way of the state's rationing access to its
scarce or costly facilities by a price mechanism. Everyone would be
able to pay for constitutionally guaranteed access, and still provide
himself with the other necessities. Everyone, then, could fairly be
subjected to economic deterrence and the riddle would be solved.
On the other hand, the existence of functional indigency seems to
be an injustice by definition." 7 Claims to free access for the functionally indigent-the very claims that stir up the deterrence problem
-of course are rooted in that very perception of injustice. So the
riddle posed by free access claims is a riddle, one might say, with a
moral function-a riddle that pricks our social conscience.
There are times, and the Kras/Ortwein episode strikes me as
one of them, when courts seem to be acting as though it were an elevated form of judicial artistry to help us block out troublesome moral
riddles-an effect which a court can achieve by studiously refusing to
name a right a right, to name an injustice an injustice. Now is that
the judiciary's mission: moral anaesthesiology? Or is it not a high judicial function, when the context is appropriately judicial and the legal merits are tolerably clear, to confront us with-not to save us
from-the riddles that prick our consciences?
APPENDIX: REMEDIAL SELF-HELP AND "STATE
ACTION"
In this appendix I consider in somewhat speculative fashion the proposition that private actions causing harm to others become "state action" covered by the procedural due process guaranty, as soon as remedial justifications are summoned to purge such actions of a wrongful, liability-producing,
quality they would otherwise have." 8
117. That is, a person is called functionally indigent when he cannot afford the
prices normally charged for all the goods and benefits to which he is justly entitled.
118. A remedial justification is one referring to an inequity previously introduced
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The argument for this proposition partakes of the "public function" or
"state function" approach to the question of "state action."" 9 In a somewhat superficial vein, the claim would be that coercive correction of interpersonal inequity--call it corrective justice-is intrinsically, by its very nature, the proper business of the state, so that when self-interested private
agents are permitted (and thereby, to some extent, encouraged) to take corrective action on their own behalf ("self-help"), the state must be viewed
as having "delegated" the function of securing corrective justice to such
agents, for reasons of efficiency or whatever. One need not argue that the
state's responsiblity for corrective justice is a "non-delegable" one in order
to maintain that procedural safeguards which attend this function when performed by state officials must follow along when the function is shifted to
private agents.
Of course the claim that corrective justice is "intrinsically" a state
function requires support. Not much is added by a bare assertion that there
is a general understanding to this effect (though there may be one), or that
the social contract so stipulates. But the contractarian tradition does suggest
some important reasons why the function of corrective justice might be regarded as allocated to the state, at least in the sense that procedural safeguards applicable to "state" action must attend this function whoever may
be called upon, or allowed, to perform it.
Contractarians, certainly those of the Lockean mainstream, tend to
view the problem of corrective justice as perhaps the premier impediment
to satisfactory social life in the state of nature. It is all very well to say
that one who has suffered violation of his natural rights may punish or exact
reparation from the violator; but there remains the universally perceived difficulty of an extreme likelihood of disagreement about the question of violation or the appropriate measure of requital, leading to endless chains of corrective countermeasures and quite undermining the conditions of security
and social peace. The felt need for an authoritative and impartial forum
for control of such disputes-an essential and integral component of which
disputant-is a main prop of the libertarian justiis a fair hearing for each
12 0
fication of the state.
Only minor expansion of this simple insight is needed to support a
strong argument that corrective "self-help" ought to be deemed state action
for purposes of procedural due process guaranties. Viewing the situation
from the agent's standpoint, it makes good sense to fear that normally efficacious restraints on private actions calculated to harm another, including
both conscientious self-restraint and extralegally manifested community disapprobation, will tend to wear thin where the circumstances of corrective
into the relationship between agent and victim, which inequity the action under scrutiny
is designed to correct or resolve.
119. See, e.g., Clark & Landers, supranote 41, at 377-82.
120. See generally R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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justice apparently prevail. It is perhaps all too easy to persuade oneself
of the appropriateness of one's conduct where a remedial justification beckons, and also too easy to believe that if one does err the community's adverse judgment will tend to focus on the mistake of judgment-a merely
instrumental defect-rather than on one's innate lawlessness or moral defect.
The mistake will be "deplorable" but "understandable," and it will not deeply taint the agent's public character or self-image. From the victim's standpoint, the emotional response to having been visited with harm under the
false pretense of punishment or requital may be more acute than the response to injury heedlessly, or brutishly, or churlishly inflicted. Heedlessness surely is less fruitful of resentment than design-a truth illustrated by
the social practice of apology. At the same time, those who injure brutishly
or churlishly thereby indicate their moral inferiority and are perhaps for that
reason less resented-one can partially assuage one's injury by retreat to
the attitude of moral superiority, and at least one's own character has not
been placed in question by acceptance of injury having a corrective look
about it. It is far harder to turn the other cheek to those who purport,
though with doubtful justification, to be wreaking just deserts upon one.
And a chief strain in the special resentment stirred by unjustified requital
certainly will be-if it is true-that one has not had, and is not to 'be given,
a fair opportunity to show that the requital is truly undeserved. In sum,
there may be special risks, both of the incidence of unjustifiable injury and
also of socially debilitating emotional responses to such injuries, associated
with any suggestion that an injurious action is remedial or corrective; and
the nature of these special risks points straight to a "due process" transaction
as the appropriate risk-reducing measure.
The practical implications of all this are uncertain. On one view, they
are staggering. Since a large proportion of privately inflicted, non-accidental
harms are imaginably or potentially remedial, it might follow that every such
harm could be brought as a federal case-a deprivation without due process
because of failure to provide a prior hearing. This seems inconceivable.
Thus to give the notion of corrective justice as a state function some bite,
we might repair to the more modest proposition that the due process requirement attaches only to such injurious actions as are purportedly remedial.
But this formulation seems, as a practical matter, to boil down to the proposition that a victim who becomes a plaintiff in a civil action has a due
process right not to have his action defeated by a remedial justification,
unless he had a prior opportunity for a hearing satisfying the formal requirements of due process.
Such a proposition, if legally sound, would not be without important
consequences. It would, for example, have the effect of emasculating section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code and all other state-law doctrines designed to allow self-help. But there is no self-evident logic connecting the proposition with a general right on the part of would-be plaintiffs
not to be prevented by access fees from bringing their actions.

